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THE PERFORMANCE OF DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS AS
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR PRICE DIFFERENTIALS
UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
BY FRED H. LAW, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
The Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act,' as finally enacted by
Congress, contains no specific provision exempting functional discounts from
the types of transactions covered by its various subsections. Furthermore,
the legal status of such discounts under the act has been a significant factor
in many of the cases decided by the Federal Trade Commission [hereinafter
FTC] and the courts. This Article will examine the status of functional dis-
counts under the Robinson-Patman Act, using as a guide recent FTC and
federal court decisions.
Section 2 (a) 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act is often involved in deter-
mining whether or not a particular price has in effect injured competition.
In practice, the problem arises more often in cases of alleged second-line
injury (injury to all or part of a disfavored class of customers), or of alleged
third-line injury (injury to customers of all or part of a disfavored class
of customers of the seller who is charged with violating section 2(a) ), than in
cases of alleged first-line injury (injury to the competitors of the seller). If a
customer who is granted a favorable price differential operates at a different
distributive level from that of the seller's other customers, and if none of
the customers of any of the seller's disfavored customers are in competition
with any of the seller's customers, then it would appear to be clear that such
a price differential granted by reason of a difference in the functional status
* B.A., 1944, Cornell University; M.B.A., 1946, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B.,
1949, University of Pennsylvania Law School; member, Illinois, Pennsylvania and Ohio
Bars; member of the firm of Litsinger, Gatenbey, Spuller & Law, Chicago, Illinois.
1. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13(a), 13(b), 21(a) (1952). Section 1 of
the Robinson-Patman Act amended section 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15
U.S.C. § 13; accordingly, the references in this Article to sections 2(a), 2(c), 2(d), 2(e),
and 2(f) are to the respective subsections of section 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by
the Robinson-Patman Act.
2. Section 2 (a), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952), prohibits a seller
from discriminating in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade
and quality
• . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly
receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of
them. ...
See RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT § 8.1 (1962);
RoWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT § 8.1 (Supp. 1964),
for a background discussion of the types of situations in which the functional discount
question has been presented in section 2(a) cases.
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of the favored customer, as compared to that of the disfavored customers,
could not produce either second-line or third-line competitive injury.
The functional discount problem is also sometimes presented in section
2(d) 3 cases of alleged unlawful payments for services or facilities furnished
by a customer, and in section 2(e) 4 cases of alleged unlawful furnishing of
services or facilities by a seller to a purchaser. One of the difficult questions
to answer in such cases is whether or not a particular customer or purchaser
is to be treated as being, at least indirectly, the customer or purchaser of the
supplier or manufacturer making the allegedly illegal payment or furnishing
the allegedly illegal services or facilities, even though such customer or pur-
chaser has dealt primarily or perhaps entirely with an intermediate distributor
in connection with his purchase. The resolution of this question may then in
turn determine whether or not the customers or purchasers who have not been
granted such payments or such services or facilities on proportionally equal
terms are competitors of the parties receiving such payments, services or
facilities. If there are bona fide differences in the distributive levels at which
customers favored by such payments, services or facilities operate, as com-
pared to the distributive levels at which non-favored customers of the seller
are operating, then there can be no illegal discrimination between customers
or purchasers in connection with the making of such payments or the fur-
nishing of such services or facilities. However, the result will obviously be
otherwise if the apparent differences in the distributive levels of the seller's
customers are determined to be merely formal rather than actual differences.
The functional discount problem can also arise in section 2 (c) 5 cases
in connection with the question of whether or not a discount or allowance
granted to a particular customer was granted in lieu of brokerage or instead,
3. Section 2(d), 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1952), makes it unlawful for a
seller to make a payment to or for the benefit of a customer as compensation or in con-
sideration for any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer ". . . unless
such payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to all other
customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities."
4. Section 2(e), 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1952), declares it to be unlawful
for a seller ". . . to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against another purchaser or
purchasers ... " by furnishing services or facilities connected with the sale of the commod-
ity purchased "... upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms."
In American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1962), the court stated: "The term
'customer' in § 2(d) should be given the same meaning as 'purchaser' in § 2(a) and (e) in
order to harmonize parallel sections of a statute aimed at a common purpose." Id. at 109.
5. Section 2(c), 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1958), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a com-
mission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu
thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of
goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction, or
to an agent, representative or other intermediary therein where such intermediary
is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of
any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such compensation
is so granted or paid.
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was granted in recognition of the functional status of such customer in the
distribution system in the particular industry involved.0
Lastly, the functional discount problem may arise in section 2(f) 7 cases
wherein a buyer is charged with knowingly inducing or receiving a discrimi-
nation in price, the granting of which would constitute illegal action by the
seller under section 2(a). Competitive injury questions presented in section
2 (a) cases are, of course, necessarily also presented in section 2(f) cases,
making it important in many cases to determine whether or not an allegedly
favored buyer competes at the same functional level with non-favored buyers
from the same seller.
THE APPROACH OF THE FTC TO THE FUNCTIONAL DISCOUNT QUESTION
In 1955, Doubleday & Co.8 was the first case in which the FTC directly
recognized that a buyer could legally be reimbursed by a seller by reason of
the buying functions performed by such buyer. One of the charges made in
the FTC's complaint against Doubleday & Co., a book publisher, which also
operated several retail stores, was that it had violated section 2(a) of the
Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, by granting dis-
criminatory prices to certain jobbers or wholesalers to the injury of others
competing with them and to the injury of the competitors of Doubleday & Co.
The hearing examiner had refused to consider evidence offered by Doubleday
& Co. to show that the discounts which it allowed to the favored jobbers
were in reality functional discounts by which the respondent compensated
integrated jobbers for services rendered. However, the FTC reversed and
held that such evidence was relevant to the issues raised by the section 2(a)
charge and should have been given consideration.9
In so holding, the majority of the Commission made it clear that not
only the selling functions of the purchaser were relevant in determining
whether or not he was entitled to receive a functional discount, but also the
buying functions, stating:
In our view, to relate functional discounts solely to the purchaser's
method of resale without recognition of his buying function thwarts
competition and efficiency in marketing, and inevitably leads to
higher consumer prices. It is possible, for example, for a seller to
shift to customers a number of distributional, functions which
6. Examples of section 2(c) cases involving the functional status of particular
purchasers are Hruby Distrib. Co., TRADE REM. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) 16225 (1962)
Central Retailer-owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 317 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963).
7. Section 2(f), 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1952), provides: "It shall be
unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, knowingly
to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section."
8. 52 F.T.C. 169 (1955).
9. Id. at 209.
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the seller himself ordinarily performs. Such functions should,
in our opinion, be recognized and reimbursed. Where a busi-
nessman performs various wholesale functions, such as providing
storage, traveling salesmen and distribution of catalogues, the law
should not forbid his supplier from compensating him for such
services. Such a legal disqualification might compel him to render
these functions free of charge. The value of the service would then
be pocketed by the seller who did not earn it. Such a rule, incorrectly,
we think, proclaims as a matter of law that the integrated wholesaler
cannot possibly perform the wholesaling function; it forbids the
matter to be put to proof.' 0
However, the Commission then qualified its view by stating further:
On the other hand, the Commission should tolerate no subterfuge.
Only to the extent that a buyer actually performs certain functions,
assuming all the risks and costs involved, should he qualify for a
compensating discount. The amount of the discount should be rea-
sonably related to the expenses assumed by the buyer. It should not
exceed the cost of that part of the function he actually performs on
that part of the goods for which he performs it."
In enunciating the above principles regarding the legal status of functional
discounts in price discrimination cases, the majority of the Commission ap-
pears to have accepted almost literally the recommendations made earlier in
1955 by the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws.1
2
In General Foods Corp.,18 in 1956, the Commission appeared to retreat
somewhat from the position taken in the Doubleday case. General Foods
was charged with violating section 2(a) by granting to Institution Contract
Wagon Distributors [hereinafter ICWDs] certain discounts which were not
granted to conventional wholesale grocers. General Foods claimed that the
ICWDs were functionally distinct from its other customers in that said
ICWDs performed their selling operations in a different manner than con-
ventional wholesalers.' 4 However, the Commission held that the ICWDs,
which sold institution pack grocery products to public feeding establishments,
such as restaurants, hotels, hospitals and schools, were in competition with
the conventional wholesale grocer customers of General Foods, since both
classes of customers sold to the feeding institutions.' 5 The Commission con-
ceded that, by virtue of special contracts which the ICWDs had entered into
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS, REPORT 208-09
(1955).
13. 52 F.T.C. 798 (1956).
14. Id. at 824.
15. Id. at 825.
[Vol. 69
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
with General Foods, they were required to do several things which resulted
in their performing the function of reselling in a different manner than most
of the conventional wholesalers, but nevertheless ruled that the ICWDs could
be compensated by General Foods for the services or facilities so furnished by
them only in accordance with the terms and conditions laid down in sec-
tion 2(d). 16
Although Doubleday was not mentioned in the General Foods case, in a
later opinion, Mueller Co.,1 7 the Commission held that the views which it had
expressed in Doubleday with respect to functional pricing were, in effect,
overruled by the General Foods case.' At the same time, in Mueller the
Commission ruled that to hold that competitive injury will not result from
a functional discount which is reasonably related to the expenses assumed by
the buyer, ignores the fact that the favored buyer can derive substantial benefit
to his own business in performing the distributional function paid for by
the seller. 19
The apparent full retreat of the Commission in the Mueller case from
its prior approval of compensation for the performance of buying functions
as expressed in Doubleday, was halted in the Hruby Distrib. Co.20 case. The
Commission, in a section 2(c) proceeding, again gave its blessing to the
granting by a seller of discounts given in recognition of a buyer's functional
status. Moreover, apparently no longer considering the principles announced
in Doubleday as being entirely overruled, the FTC remarked in Hruby:
In its Section 2(a) price discrimination cases the Commission has
long recognized the legality of price differences based upon differ-
ences in the level of distribution of the customers who are charged
disparate prices. The lawfulness of such functional price differences
derives from the fact that they result in no adverse economic effects
upon particular competitors or competition in general. Thus, since
Hruby operates at a higher competitive or functional level than
wholesalers, the granting to Hruby or receipt by him of a lower price
than afforded to wholesalers would ordinarily not be questioned.
21
In the course of its opinion in Hruby, the Commission further commented
as follows:
Suppose, however, the producer has an alternative method of distri-
bution. In addition to selling to wholesalers through brokers, he sells
to them through intermediate distributors who buy from the producer
for their own account and resell to wholesalers. And suppose, further,
16. Ibid.
17. TRADE REG. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) 15686 (1962).
18. Id. 15686, at 20520.
19. Ibid.
20. TRADE REG. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) 16225 (1962).
21. Id. 16225, at 21051.
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this is done not as subterfuge or device for violating the law, but be-
cause such intermediate distributors serve a legitimate and useful
economic function in the channels of distribution of the particular in-
dustry. In such a situation the producer must of course give the
intermediate distributors some discount from his own price to the
wholesale trade in order to enable them to make a profit and stay
in business. In its very nature, the purpose of a discount or allow-
ance of this sort is not to pass on a saving in brokerage. Instead, it
is the familiar "functional discount", which the Commission has
recognized as involving no potential anticompetitive effect where the
distributor who receives the lower price does not compete at the
wholesale level.
22
Sometimes interwoven in the functional discount problem is the question
of whether a given purchasing entity is in reality a distinct organization
operating at its own separate level in the distribution system, or merely
the controlled agent or representative of its own customers. If the latter is
the case, then the customers should be treated as the actual purchasers from
the seller granting the alleged functional discounts.
In its 1963 ruling in Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons, Inc.,23 the FTC held
that a seller had violated section 2(a) by charging certain favored retailer-
customers, buying through an intermediary corporation which they owned,
as much as 18% less than it charged competing retailer-customers. In rejecting
the contention that the intermediary corporation was a distinct corporate
entity operating as a wholesaler, the Commission found that the purpose
and effect of the purchases by the retail stores was clearly to provide special
prices to the stores. The Commission relied upon the holding of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in American News Co. v.
FTC24 that if a manufacturer deals with a retailer through the intermediary of
wholesalers, dealers or jobbers, the retailer may nevertheless be a "customer"
or "purchaser" of the manufacturer if the latter deals directly with the retailer
and controls the terms upon which he buys. The Commission, having found
that the seller (Kaplan), at least to some extent, influenced the terms upon
which the stores made their purchases, concluded that the real purchasers
and customers for the items sold by Kaplan were the individual stores.
Illustrative of the type of situation in which questions of functional com-
petition can arise in section 2(d) proceedings is the case of Tri-Valley Pack-
ing Ass'n.25 Here, the Commission found that a wholesaler, buying and ware-
housing merchandise and reselling the same primarily to its retailer-members
in the Boston area, which was paid a promotional allowance by the seller,
22. Id. 16225, at 21052.
23. TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 1f 16666 (1963).
24. 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962).
25. TRADE REG. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) 15893 (1962).
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was in functional competition with another wholesaler located in 'the same
area which sold to approximately 700 small or medium size independent
grocers and which did not receive an allowance.2 6 Also in Tri-Valley the
Commission found that, Fred Meyer, Inc., a retail grocery chain operating
in the Portland, Oregon area, which had been granted an allowance, was
in functional competition with a wholesaler in the same area which did not
receive an allowance and whose retail customers allegedly were "indirect"
customers of the seller (Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n) .27_
Furthermore, regarding section 2(d), the Commission subsequent to
Tri-Valley held in Fred Meyer, Inc.,28 that a supplier who sells both to re-
tailers directly and to wholesalers who sell to competing retailers, must make
promotional allowances granted to the direct-buying retailers available also
to such wholesalers. In a concurring and dissenting opinion, however, Com-
missioner Elman argued that the Commission's order against Fred Meyer,
Inc. should have gone further and specifically required the wholesalers to
pass the allowances on to their retail customers who were in competition with
the favored direct-buying retailer.29 It is also interesting to note that the
majority of the Commission in Fred Meyer thought that United Grocers of
Portland, Oregon, described as being a co-operative or non-profit organization
owned by some 300 odd retail-grocer members, was a retailer rather than-a
wholesaler and, therefore, entitled to have made available to it promotional
allowances similar to those offered to a direct-buying retail chain such as
Fred Meyer, Inc. located in the same geographical area.8
An example of the Commission's treatment of the functional discount
problem in a section 2(f) case can be found in its recent decision in National
Parts Warehouse.31 Here, the manager-general partner of a limited partner-
ship and also its 55 limited partners, all of whom were jobbers of automotive
parts, were held by the FTC to have violated section 2(f) by receiving price
advantages over competing jobbers of up to 20%. In rejecting the argument
that the partnership organization performed a real intermediary function,
the Commission held that in the case of the approximately 20o of the mer-
chandise handled by the organization which was "drop-shipped" to the limited
26. Id. 1 15893 at 20705. For a more detailed description of the functional status of
Tri-Valley's customers in the Boston area, see the subsequent opinion of the circuit court
in Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, TRADE REG. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.) ff 71059, at
79191 (1964).
27. TRADE REGj. REP. g 15893, at 20705. For a more detailed description of the
functional status of Tri-Valley's customers in the Portland, Oregon area, see the subse-
quent opinion of the circuit court in Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, TRADE REG. REP.
(1964 Trade Cas.) 1 71059, at 79192 (1964).
28. TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 1 16368 (1963).
29. Id. 11 6368, at 21231-32.
30. Id. 16368, at 21214.
31. TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) ff 16700 (1963).
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partner jobbers, the partnership organization acted as a mere "bookkeeping
device" for the collection of price concessions, and that the jobber partners
were plainly the "purchasers" from the drop-shipping manufacturers.
32
Concerning the remaining 80% of the merchandise handled by the part-
nership which passed through a warehouse owned and operated by it, the
Commission ruled that the fact that the partnership organization may have
actually performed the same warehousing function that other warehouse
distributors performed could have no effect on the question of whether the
partnership organization was a "purchaser" in its own right, or a mere agent
of its own jobbers.-" It said that "the mere ownership and operation of physi-
cal facilities cannot convert an agent into a principal,' 34 and that the owner-
ship of the partnership organization by the jobber partners and their "control"
of the flow of its income from the partnership coffers to their own pockets
were the things that established the principal-agent relationship, and made the
jobber-partners responsible for the acts of the partnership. 35 The "control"
thus referred to by the Commission apparently was considered by it to exist
as a result of the fact that patronage dividends were distributed by the part-
nership to the various jobber-partners.36
In a concurring opinion, Commissioner Higginbotham stated that a sec-
tion 2(f) order was appropriate because the partnership organization did not
perform any bona fide warehouse function in connection with the drop-ship-
ment sales which constituted about 1/5 of its business, so that it could not be
concluded that the partnership was "selling distribution" to the manufacturers
in regard to the drop-shipment sales." By implication it could reasonably be
concluded that he felt that the cease and desist order was not appropriate in
regard to the 80% of the merchandise handled by the partnership which
passed through its own warehouse.
In his dissenting opinion in National Parts Warehouse, Commissioner
Elman vigorously objected to the test of legality announced by the Com-
mission's majority, i.e., whether the jobber-partners had "control" of the
terms on which they obtained parts through the partnership. 38 He argued that
this left no opportunity for the lawful operation of such a buying group,
because control of the group by its members is inherent in the purpose of




36. The jobber partners, in reserving to themselves the absolute legal right to
receive all of their creature's profits, have made themselves responsible for the
acts by which it "earns" those profits. Everything that . . . it does is done not
for itself, but for those who receive its profits. It is, therefore, their agent.
Ibid.
37. Id. 16700, at 21627.
38. Id. 1 16700, at 21626.
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the arrangement, which is to obtain "savings" for the members8 9 In his
opinion, when a manufacturer compensates a warehouse distributor for per-
forming the essential function of carrying its line of products and maintain-
ing the inventory necessary for their ready availability, the manufacturer is
"buying distribution," and where said function is performed instead by a
co-operative organization, the result is a type of vertical integration in the
distributional process. 40 He further amplified his position by asserting that
if a competitive advantage accrues to the members of such an organization by
reason of the discount paid by the manufacturer in recognition of the per-
formance of such function, said advantage does not result from any arbitrary
or unjustifiable price discrimination but from the fact that he is performing
two functions in the distributional process instead of one, and that if the
competitive implications deserve attention, the solution is not to be found
in the Robinson-Patman Act.41 He then concluded by remarking that, ". . . if
shown to be necessary to prevent competitive injury, the Commission might
justifiably require that a warehousing discount be granted to all competing
purchasers who perform the same economic function" 42 and by stating that
".. . if membership in a group buying organization were shown to be a
competitive necessity for the small jobber, his exclusion on a discriminatory or
otherwise unjustifiable basis might be regarded as an unfair method of com-
petition under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act."
'43
It is interesting to note that in the case of Ark-La-Tex Warehouse
Distrib., Inc.44 the Commission, only a few months prior to the issuance of
its opinion in National Parts Warehouse, remanded the hearing examiner's
initial decision for the entry of a new initial decision containing specific find-
ings with respect to the question of whether the respondent therein was a
legitimate wholesale distributor of automotive products and supplies which
was entitled to a wholesale distributor discount, or merely a sham whose 22
jobber-members should be viewed as the actual purchasers of the products
involved, for purposes of section 2(f).
In its final order to cease and desist in Tung-Sol Elec., Inc.,45 the Com-
mission upheld the hearing examiner's findings that Tung-Sol had violated
section 2(a). The examiner found that certain jobber-owned or controlled
"buying groups" which were granted a "redistribution allowance" of 20%
on the ground that they functioned not as jobbers, but as warehouse distribu-
39. Ibid.
40. Id. 1 16700, at 21626-27.
41. Id. 1 16700, at 21627.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 16441 (1963).
45. TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) % 16562 (1963).
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tors reselling to jobbers, did not actually operate as warehouse distributors
or perform functions in the redistribution of the seller's products.
4 6
One of the FTC's most recent opinions, Purolator Prod., Inc., 47 also was
concerned with pricing practices in the automotive parts industry. Purolator,
a manufacturer of air, oil and fuel filters for trucks and automobiles, was
held to have violated section 2(a) by granting greater discounts to warehouse
distributors with branches than were granted to competing warehouse distribu-
tors who did not maintain branches, and by granting, through the indirect
purchaser doctrine,48 greater discounts to warehouse distributors than were
granted to jobbers who competed with them in reselling the filters. The
majority of the Commission concluded that even though the respondent-seller's
cost studies demonstrated that its warehouse distributors, maintaining branches
to whom they reshipped merchandise which they purchased from the re-
spondent, spent more in such reshipping operation than they received from
the respondent through the special discount granted to them for such opera-
tion, such fact did not demonstrate an absence of competitive injury.
49
As to the practice of the respondent in granting greater discounts to
Warehouse distributors than it granted to jobbers, the Commission held that
the record as a whole indicated that the respondent controlled the relation-
ship between its warehouse distributors and their jobber subvendees by means
of ". . . approval or selection of jobbers, the imposition of exclusive dealing
or full requirements contracts on jobbers, the prescription of distributor-
jobber resale prices, and jobber inventory control." 50 From this the Commis-
sion concluded that those jobbers who were nominally the distributor's cus-
tomers were actually customers of the respondent seller under the "indirect
purchaser" doctrine promulgated in cases such as American News Co. v.
FTC.5 1
In a separate opinion Commissioner Elman, citing his aforementioned
dissent in National Parts Warehouse,52 implied that he did not concur in
the opinion of the FTC majority in the Purolator case. 53 He called attention
46. Id. 16562, at 21483.
47. TRADE REG. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.) 16877 (1964). See also The Quaker Oats
Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.) 1 17134 (1964); Alhambra Motor Parts &
S. Cal. Jobbers, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.) 17138 (1964).
48. In past cases, where the evidence has demonstrated that the manufacturer
exercised a specified degree of control over the terms of the sale between the
wholesaler and his purchaser, there have been findings that the wholesaler's
purchaser, termed the "indirect purchaser," was, for the purposes of Section 2(a),
a purchaser from the manufacturer.
TRADE REG. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.) 1 16877, at 21885.
49. Ibid.
50. Id. 16877 at 21887.
51. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
52. TRADE REG. REP. .(1964 Trade Cas.) 16877, at 21894.
53. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
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to the complexity of the competing channels of distribution in the automotive
parts industry and the intricate and finely balanced pricing system under
which the respondent received different prices for products sold through
different sub-channels of distribution defined according to the functions per-
formed by the companies in each of them,54 and stated:
The result of this system is that competing companies which perform
different functions pay different prices for the same products. It does
not necessarily follow, however, that there is present the kind of anti-
competitive price discrimination which the Robinson-Patman Act
was intended to, or as a practical matter can, prevent.55
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE FUNCTIONAL DISCOUNT PROBLEM
Although the legal status of functional discounts under the Robinson-
Patman Act has not thus far been squarely settled by any court decision, there
have been a few cases in which the courts have given some consideration,
either directly or indirectly, to the problem. Probably the most direct con-
sideration given to the problem is to be found in the 1962 opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Alhambra Motor
Parts v. FTC.56 In Alhambra the FTC had issued an order requiring a co-
operative corporation and its 59 jobber-members to cease the practice
of inducing and receiving price discriminations in violation of section 2(f) .57
The co-operative corporation has been engaged in two different types of
operations. As to one of these, namely its "brokerage" operations, it con-
ceded that its practices were in violation of the applicable provisions of
the Robinson-Patman Act,58 as construed in Mid-South Distrib. v. FTC59
and American Motors Specialties Co. v. FTC.60
In its other type of operations, described as "warehouse" operations, the
co-operative received a redistribution discount ranging from 20% to 28% on
orders for merchandise which it stocked in anticipation of future orders from
its individual jobber-members. The jobber-members were credited by the
co-operative each year with a "retained impound" amounting to the difference
between the jobber prices at which the members were originally billed and
the price which the co-operative paid to its suppliers. The redistribution dis-
count allowed to the co-operative on its warehouse purchases was the same
as that allowed to independent warehouse distributors.
54. TRADE REG. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.) 16877, at 21894.
55. Ibid.
56. 309 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1962).
57. See Alhambra Motor Parts and S. Cal. Jobbers, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1964
Trade Cas.) 1 17138 (1964).
58. 309 F.2d at 216.
59. 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 838 (1961).
60. 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1960).
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The court held that the record revealed without dispute that the co-
operative corporation, ".. .whether considered as an independent entity and
the buyer from the manufacturers, or only as the agent of jobber-members who
were the buyers, performed a warehouse and distribution service which saved
money for the manufacturers.""' It said that although the evidence may not
have established with precision that the cost savings to the manufacturers
were equal to the discount allowed, the mere fact that the evidence showed
that there were differences in the methods by which manufacturers sold to
jobber-members, as compared to independent jobbers, placed the burden on
the Commission to show that the cost saving could not be commensurate with
the price differential. 62 The court based this conclusion upon the language
used by the United States Supreme Court in Automatic Canteen v. FTC.3
The court then set aside the Alhambra cease and desist order insofar as it
related to the warehouse redistribution discount and remanded the case to
the FTC for the purpose of making findings and conclusions regarding the
economic and legal significance of the facts.6 4 The court also directed that
the issue of the status of the co-operative organization as the buyer and direct
recipient of the price differential should be further considered. 65
The inclination of the ninth circuit to give serious consideration to the
functional operations performed by particular buyers, as expressed in Alham-
bra, does not seem to have been shared by the majority in the seventh circuit's
1963 opinion in Mueller Co. v. FTC.6 6 There, the seventh circuit majority
upheld the Commission's findings that the additional 10% discount given
by the respondent-seller to its "limit" jobber customers (also referred to by
the court as "stocking" jobbers) over and above the discount which it granted
to its "regular" jobber customers constituted a discrimination in price and a
violation of section 2(a). The court said that although the additional discount
was allegedly given to cover the cost of maintaining an inventory of the
61. 309 F.2d at 218.
62. Id. at 219.
63. 346 U.S. 61 (1953). See 309 F.2d at 219.
64. These were the facts to be utilized:
(1) that the cooperative organization performed substantially the same economic
function as other warehouse distributors who received the same functional dis-
count; (2) that the performance of this function resulted in cost savings to the
sellers; and (3) that the distribution to the jobber-members of the net gain from
the functional discounts in accordance with the volume of their purchases was
within the apparent protection of Section 4 of the Robinson-Patman Act.
309 F.2d at 219.
Section 4 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b)
(1952), provides:
Nothing in this Act shall prevent a cooperative association from returning to
its members, producers, or consumers the whole, or any part of, the net earnings
or surplus resulting from its trading operations in proportion to their purchases
or sales from, to, or through the association.
65. 309 F.2d at 221.
66. 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963).
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products of Mueller Co., the record contained ". . . a large number of invoices
showing that stocking jobbers received the added discount on goods which
they purchased after having received orders from their own customers." 67
Like the Commission in its opinion in General Foods,68 the court also in-
jected the statutory standards of section 2(d) into a section 2(a) proceeding
by ruling that the "stocking" jobber classification and the added discount
were not made available to all other customers of the seller. 69
In his dissenting opinion in Mueller, Judge Swygert contended that, in
finding a violation of section 2 (a) by Mueller Co., the Commission had re-
jected the views which it previously espoused on the subject of functional
discounts in Doubleday & Co.70 In this connection he stated:
I am aware that the Robinson-Patman Act does not expressly recog-
nize that certain buyers in a class may be additionally compensated
for performing extra distribution functions which normally would be
performed by the seller. But neither does it prevent such compen-
sation through a discount in purchasing price which discount reflects
a reasonable relationship to the services performed and the facilities
furnished the seller, absent any hint of subterfuge. . . . It seems to
me that a realistic approach to the marketing situation presented in
this case justifies an interpretation of the Act so as to allow jobbers
reasonable compensation, by way of an added discount, for perform-
ing a distribution function with which Mueller had heretofore been
burdened.71
In Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC,1 2 the ninth circuit again gave
somewhat detailed attention to the question of whether or not customers of
the respondent-seller located in the same geographical area were in functional
67. Id. at 47.
68. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
69. 323 F.2d at 46.
70. Id. at 48. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
71. 323 F.2d at 49-50.
72. TRADE REG. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.) g 71059 (9th Cir. 1964). Certain dictum in
FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960), also could be interpreted as recognizing
that the unique functional status of a particular buyer might exempt a discount granted
to him from illegality under section 2(c), particularly the Court's comments that:
There is no evidence that the buyer rendered any services to the seller or to the
respondent nor that anything in its method of dealing justified its getting a dis-
criminatory price by means of a reduced brokerage charge. We would have quite
a different case if there were such evidence and we need not explore the appli-
cability of § 2(c) to such circumstances.
Id. at 173.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Thomasville Chair Co.
v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962), interpreted the above and other statements made
by the Supreme Court in the Broch case as holding that a reduction in price which gives
effect to reduced commissions paid by the seller is not in violation of section 2(c) unless
the reduction in price is "without justification based on actual bona fide differences in the
costs of sales resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commod-
ities are sold or delivered." Id. at 545-46.
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competition with each other. In setting aside the FTC's conclusion that Tri-
Valley had violated section 2(d), the court concluded that the evidence re-
lating to the section 2(d) charges did not show that the customers of Tri-
Valley who did not receive the allowances in question were in functional
competition in the same geographical area with customers who received the
allowances in connection with purchases of products of like grade and quality
within approximately the same period of time.73
Specifically, the court found that even though Central Grocers, Inc. of
Boston, Massachusetts, which functioned as a wholesaler buying and ware-
housing merchandise and reselling the same primarily to its retail members
and which was paid a promotional allowance, was in functional competition
with Standard Grocery Company, a Boston wholesaler supplying 700 small
or medium size independent grocers and which did not receive an allowance,
the evidence did not indicate that Tri-Valley sold its canned goods to both
Central Grocers and Standard Grocery during approximately the same period
of time. 4 Concerning the other two direct customers Tri-Valley had in the
Boston area (First National Stores and A. & P.), which did not receive a
promotional allowance, the court held that they were retailers and as such
were not entitled to treatment comparable to that accorded Central Grocers,
because they were not in functional competition with Central. 75 The court
further stated that, as to said retailers, "the only way of showing a section
2(d) violation would be to treat Central Grocers' retail outlets as indirect
customers of Tri-Valley." 76 It then added that this could "not be done in
the absence of a showing that Tri-Valley engaged in a course of direct dealing
with such retail outlets," 77 and that no such showing had been made.
7 8
The court also held that Tri-Valley had not violated section 2(d) by
granting an allowance in the Portland, Oregon area to the Fred Meyer, Inc.
retail chain, which had not been granted proportionally to a concern known
as Hudson House, because the wholesale operation of Hudson House was
not in functional competition with the operations of Meyer,79 and it had
not been shown "that the independent retailers served by Hudson House
were indirect customers of Tri-Valley."8 0 As to the retail operation of Hudson
House, the court said that if there was such an operation, no section 2(d)
violation had been shown, because it had not been shown that any Tri-Valley
73. TRADE REG. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.) J 71059, at 79193.
74. Ibid.
75. Id. 1 71059, at 79193-94.






goods had been purchased indirectly by the alleged retail outlets of Hudson
House during the period in question.81
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing it appears that the status of functional discounts
under the Robinson-Patman Act is still very much unsettled. However, from
the increased attention which has been devoted to the problem, it is predicted
that before too long more definite guide lines for the determination of the
legality of such discounts will become established.
The Robinson-Patman Act does not expressly permit the payment of
additional compensation to certain buyers in recognition of their performance
of extra distribution functions, but neither does it prevent such compensation
in the form of a discount which reflects a reasonable relationship to the serv-
ices performed and the facilities furnished the seller. The FTC took this
realistic view of the functional discount problem in Doubleday, but its subse-
quent decisions, for the most part, failed to give direct consideration to it.
All that the Commission should be concerned with determining in section
2(a) and section 2(f) cases is whether the discounts in question have the
effect of substantially lessening competition, tending to create a monopoly, or
injuring, destroying or preventing competition with another. These are the
specific standards prescribed by the Robinson-Patman Act for determining
whether a given discrimination in price is prima facie illegal. Similarly, in
section 2(d) and section 2(e) cases, the Commission need only concern it-
self, where the defense is based upon alleged functional differences performed
by competing purchasers, with determining in a realistic manner whether
the favored customers of the supplier actually performed additional functions
not performed by the disfavored customers. In making such determinations,
either in price discrimination cases or in section 2(d) and section 2(e) cases,
the Commission should additionally, of course, determine from the evidence
whether or not the alleged functional discounts bear a reasonable relationship
to the additional buying functions performed by the favored purchasers.
In section 2(c) cases where the functional status of a particular buyer
is at issue, the real question, as recognized by the FTC in Hruby, should be
whether the discounts or price concessions alleged to have been granted in
lieu of brokerage were in reality granted in recognition of the additional or
special distributional functions performed by the buyer.
As to cases involving price discrimination charges under sections 2(a)
and 2(f) and cases involving the payment of allowances or the furnishing of
services or facilities on disproportionate terms under sections 2(d) and 2(e),
81. Ibid.
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Commissioner Elman (in his opinions in the National Parts Warehouse and
Purolator cases), the ninth circuit court in the Alhambra and Tri-Valley
Packing Association cases), and Judge Swygert of the seventh circuit court
(in his dissent in the Mueller case) have laid out logical blueprints to be
utilized as the basis for further clarification by the FTC and the courts of
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